-2 -create a new legal order, premised on the respect for economic, civil and political rights administered by a new justice system: a post-national, European one. Of course, the new legal order could only come into existence if individuals-European citizens-were governed by the same law wherever they lived, worked or travelled within the bounds of a new European space no longer dominated by national borders. 5 To promote uniform interpretation of this new body of laws, the Treaty of Rome created the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the "European Court of Justice" or "ECJ"), the successor to the commercially-focused Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community in operation since 1951. 6 The ECJ has a broad and varied original jurisdiction. Not only can it entertain challenges to the legality of acts by EU institutions (art. 230), it has jurisdiction over actions by the EU Commission against member states for failure to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty of Rome (art. 226), and it can review challenges to national institutions' failures to adhere to the terms of the Treaty of Rome (recours en carence) (art. 232) (on grounds such as misuse of power, failure of observing due process, failure to act, etc.). Furthermore, the ECJ is competent to give "preliminary rulings" on questions (questions Union ("TEU" or the "Maastricht Treaty"), signed on February 2, 1992. Treaty on European Union and Final Act. Feb.7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 . 6 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 ("Treaty of Rome"). The other major supranational European Court, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") was created one year earlier under the auspices of the European Convention of Human Rights. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 14, 1950 (the "European Convention of Human Rights" or the "Convention"). Because the Convention includes 20 European states outside the 27 EU members and this study focuses solely on conflicts between French national law and EU law, ECHRrelated developments will only be discussed when absolutely necessary. Yet, the traditional separation between EU law and the Convention regime deserves some revision in light of the December 1, 2009 entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the Maastricht Treaty by, among other things, referring expressly to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (the "Charter"), making it legally binding on all EU members. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007 Dec. 13, , 2007 50 ("Treaty of Lisbon"). Because the Charter expressly proscribes EU regulations and directives from contradicting the Convention (the UK and Poland have opted out, however), it is also binding on EU members when they are implementing EU law. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 14, 2007 Dec. 14, , 2007 15. This means that the two regimes have now converged into one, with the caveat that the Convention now has binding effect on European supranational and national actors as a matter of EU law. Because the Convention also has binding effect on all 27 EU members as a matter of their own foreign relations law due to their status as signatories, this convergence sets up interesting jurisdictional conflicts as national courts face the possibility of having to choose between potentially different interpretations of human rights law between the ECJ and ECHR. national laws of transposition to directives but also broader conflicts between national measures (including regulations and administrative acts) and directives.
Thus, this study analyzes the extent to which the French High Courts have applied domestic law in contemplation of European directives. In doing so, this article expands on the existing literature in two key ways. First, it attempts to verify empirically whether there are any discernable differences among these Courts in how they have decided disputes involving conflicts between French law and EU directives (i.e., regardless whether a transposing law is involved). It analyzes the High Courts' decisions from 1989 to 2008 to determine whether national adjudicators have taken a pro-Europe or Euroskeptic stance based on how deferential each Court has been to EU directives in these conflict cases. The study tests whether any observable difference emerges in the patterns of decisions adopted by these Courts. Second, after detecting a tendency towards convergence in their deferential treatment of EU law and ECJ precedent, the article presents an overarching rationale for the growing degree of convergence, one largely based on shifting perceptions of Europe and its institutions, fostered by continuous constitutional reforms, judicial adaptation and growing European judicial comity.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the legal and political science literature on the relationship between national and supranational courts on both sides of the Atlantic and ponders whether a focus on supranational courts can accurately reveal the truly multidimensional nature of European judicial integration. After making the case that it cannot, the article discusses more recent French scholarship on the subject and illustrates its richness by focusing on the role played by the ensemble of the French judiciary.
In light of (a) this study's inquiry on French national courts' role as European adjudicators and (b) the uniqueness of the French judicial system, Part II provides a primer on its basic characteristics. The uniqueness of the French judicial system, it will be demonstrated, owes much to France's historic attachment to legislative sovereignty (or the theory of the loi-écran, as it is known in France), namely the political-legal doctrine under which promulgated statutes (until quite recently) could not be challenged before any court. Part II shows that this limitation on the jurisdiction of French courts is one of the major reasons for the development of a dual system of review: where a priori constitutional review 12 operates on parallel with ex post conformity review, the latter of which is the focus of this article. 13 Part II identifies and explains these review systems as responses to 12 By a priori constitutional review, I refer to the-until-recently sole method of constitutional review in France: abstract review. This method of review remains restricted to certain political actors who have standing to file constitutionally-based challenges against approved but yet-to-be promulgated bills, thus forming a case that is heard exclusively by the Constitutional Council. See 1958 CONST., art. 61-1. I will discuss the implications of the recent introduction of ex post constitutional review later in this article. 13 By ex post conformity review, I refer solely to court challenges to the conformity of promulgated national law (hence ex post) and other government acts with respect to France's international engagements. As will be shown, this form of review, though not expressly authorized in the Constitution, has been interpreted by the French High Courts to be essential for the effective enforcement of article 55 of their Constitution. However, as stated in note 6, this article focuses only on the subset of conformity review litigation that involves challenges to historic-legal constraints that have deeply affected the manner in which both the Council itself and the other High Courts conduct all review in France, thus having a direct impact on how French adjudicators apply EU law.
Following Part II's discussion of the Constitutional Council's development of a dichotomous review system, Part III turns to both Cassation's 14 and Council of State's 15 initial deployment of conformity review in the Vabre (1975) and Nicolo (1989) decisions. These were the pivotal moments where these Courts, after an invitation by the Constitutional Council, "found" an implicit authorization under the Constitution to review the conformity of a French statute with respect to the Treaty of Rome, thus deploying conformity review in France. Part IV provides a methodology for the development of the study's database. Part V offers a quantitative analysis that shows a high degree of convergence among the High Courts in their treatment of national law/EU directive conflicts, a convergence that reveals a high degree of deference to EU directives. The implications of a strong convergence and alignment among these courts with respect to European supranational jurisprudence are also examined.
This article concludes by suggesting that the Constitutional Reform of 2008, 16 which expanded the Constitutional Council's jurisdiction to ex post, concrete (i.e., "asapplied") constitutional review, introduces a number of challenging questions that will occupy the minds of French High Court Justices for years to come. As a newer system of constitutional review begins operating side-by-side with a largely overlapping EU law conformity review system, which increases the likelihood of jurisdictional disputes, the relationship among French Justices and their relationship with the ECJ are likely to face new pressures.
I.
Prior Literature on European Judicial Integration Despite significant scholarly interest in the United States and Great Britain on European integration, American 17 and British comparativists and political scientists tend to existing national laws vis-à-vis EU law. Thus, conflicts between French law and other European law (e.g., the Convention) or international law are outside the scope of this article.
14 Administration des Douanes v. Société des Cafés Jacques Vabre & J. Weigel et Cie. SARL, [1975 ] 2 CMLR 336 (Cass., Ch. mix. 6, May 24, 1975 ) (Court of Cassation, Combined Chambers) (Invalidating an internal consumption tax established by the French Customs Code due to its incompatibility with certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome and holding that Communitarian law, by virtue of article 55 of the Constitution, constitutes "a separate legal order integrated with that of the Member states . . . and is binding on their courts."). 15 Raoul Georges Nicolo and Another, [1990] 1 CMLR 173 (Conseil d 'Etat, Ass., October 20, 1989 ) (Council of State, Assembly) (holding that a national law providing rules for the election of representatives to the Assembly of the European Communities was not in conflict with certain provisions of the Treaty of Rome, after finding that article 55 of the Constitution implicitly authorized the Court to engage in conformity review).
examine the relationship between national law and EU law from a supranational perspective, often subsuming discussions of national courts' decisions under analyses of European Court of Justice ("ECJ") decisions.
18
This supranational focus is influenced by the tremendous growth of EU judicial and non-judicial institutions and the particular path of constitutionalization they pursued-a path paved largely by supranational judicial lawmaking and technocrat-driven incremental treaty-making.
19
At first look, it seems reasonable that, as a substantial portion of law-creation moves away from individual states to the purview of supranational institutions and actors, legal analysis should shift away from a purely state-centric approach. This shift, however, does not require that all analysis of European integration occur only at high levels of aggregation. That would risk ignoring the very rich and illuminating contribution that diverse state-based legal institutions have given to this process. A "bottom-up" study of this integration process that takes the French High Courts as a point of departure would explain how gradually, over the last fifty-years, these institutions distanced themselves from purely state-centric perspectives to embrace the underlying values inspiring the creation of the EU. This scholarship is highly valuable due to its enlightening discussion of questions regarding domestic implementation of EU directives in full view of supranational processes, but, unfortunately, tends to be available only in French.
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Although these studies benefit from approaching EU law from both national and supranational perspectives, they often overemphasize punctual friction points (i.e., exceptional cases) between the French High Courts and the ECJ and, therefore, fail to give due credit to the high level of inter-institutional mutual cooperation in the vast majority of their important decisions. 23 Remarkably, a number of judge-written articles have appeared throughout the last decade to explain how French judges view the role of EU law.
24
These articles might arguably be considered an attempt to offset French scholars' tendency to focus on exceptional decisions and occasional friction by depicting the relationship between judges and EU law and institutions as a far more cooperative venture. change the narrative of French-EU judicial relations from a "war of the judges" to a similarly broad "dialogue of the judges," 25 one needs more than anecdotal evidence of such cooperation. One must empirically demonstrate the extent of judicial integration of the EU legal order in France by looking at how the French High Courts have applied domestic law in contemplation of European directives. Surely, the ideal balance between wealth of information and generalization in studies of European judicial integration could be reached by a series of country-specific empirical studies, like the present one, where patterns of judicial integration are investigated, and the picture sketched by supranational research complemented. To accomplish this goal, at least with respect to France, one must first understand the lay of the judicial landscape, a matter to which I now turn.
II.
The Uniqueness of Review in France and the Constitutional Council A. The Nature of Review in France To understand how EU-conformity litigation sprung from the Constitutional Council's jurisprudence to become a full-fledged review system operated by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State, one must first disabuse oneself of the notion that French judges engage in "judicial review," as the term is traditionally employed this side of the Atlantic. Clearly, the term cannot be used in countries like France, where ordinary judges and courts lack the power to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislated law, whether in as-applied or facial challenges.
26
In fact, in much of Continental Europe, the task of the judiciary has been merely to guarantee the supremacy of parliamentary acts over decrees, regulations and administrative acts. This does not mean that constitutional provisions are parameters to be employed solely by legislators as they consider enacting statutes. Rather, it means that only a certain type of court, the constitutional court, has subject-matter jurisdiction over constitutional disputes. In fact, the detachment of constitutional courts from the hierarchy of the judiciary (broadly understood) 27 mirrors the detachment of constitutional law from the hierarchy of infra-constitutional laws, further demonstrating the separation between constitutional and infra-constitutional law. This separate reserve for constitutional-order questions also explains why, traditionally, the competence of constitutional courts was limited to answering discrete constitutional questions referred to them by a very limited number of actors: certain politicians (i.e., the few who until recently held the monopoly on standing to trigger constitutional review in France) or High Courts (as it has been the case in Spain, Italy and, since 2010, France) . Clearly, such referrals from the legislature and the judiciary to national constitutional courts constitute a form of abstract constitutional adjudication far removed from the traditional "case or controversy" judicial review that takes place in the United States.
Indeed, using judicial review to describe the work of judges is even more problematic in France, where Jean-Jacques Rousseau's thinking on separation of powers led to their subjugation to legislative authority.
28
In 1790, the legislature created the predecessor to today's Court of Cassation and placed it under its supervision to ensure that judges nominated during the Ancien Régime did not interpret the new laws against the interests of Revolutionary France.
29
Although the Revolutionary period's strong version of legislative sovereignty has long been abandoned, legislative supremacy, in its moderate versions, greatly influenced the formation of France's bifurcated judiciary and thus remains a part of French legal culture.
30
Finally, even the recent constitutional reform, which gave the Constitutional Council the authority to displace legislated law deemed constitutionally infirm, placed far more restrictions on this form of review than is typically placed on traditional versions of judicial review.
31
For instance, the Council only hears referrals, so no writ mechanism links ordinary citizens with the Council or gives it discretion to choose the cases it reviews. Rather, the Council's task is to answer questions prioritaires de constitutionnalité, i.e., incidental questions involving constitutional issues in live cases pending before the French courts. Procedurally, the Council only takes jurisdiction over the question presented to it, not the entire case.
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These distinctions suggest that, clearly, it is best to use the broader term "review" adding to it a more contextually adequate qualifier-as in constitutional review versus conformity review, abstract review versus concrete review, or some other adjective-rather than falling prey to applying familiar but not necessarily overlapping concepts. With these qualifications in mind, the path is now clear to explain how conformity review appeared as a second system of review in France. 28 This subjugation is implicit in Rousseau's belief that "the law is the expression of General Will," also inscribed in article 6 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. 29 Despite the decline in Parliament's power, due to the emergence of the presidency, and the introduction of constitutional review, promulgated statutes retained their status as the expression of the "General Will" and, thus, could not be displaced by either the newly created Constitutional Council or France's judiciary. 35 In fact, so unswerving was the framer's adherence to parliamentary sovereignty that ex post review was placed outside the purview of the Constitutional Council or of any other court in France. As the logic of the times seemed to dictate, article 61 would not confer on the Council any express jurisdiction over fundamental rights-these could be used to strike down approved laws that did not conform to constitutional rights. Rather, article 61 appeared to circumscribe the scope of Council constitutional review simply to questions regarding the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. 36 This meant that Council review would be deployed exclusively to ensure that Parliament would not act beyond the confines of its article 34 powers, so as not to encroach on the President's constitutional prerogatives.
Operationally, this lack of jurisdiction over disputes involving the constitutionality of promulgated law required that Council review occur during the brief period between parliamentary passage of a new bill and presidential promulgation, that is, before a statute 33 See 1958 CONST., arts. 5-19. 35 See 1958 CONST., art. 61 (as amended) . In fact, a proposal giving Cassation and the Council of State the power to refer to the Constitutional Council questions regarding the constitutionality of statutes in concrete cases was rejected by the original framers largely on grounds that it would introduce a "government of judges," revealing the strong mistrust of the judiciary among the French political classes, both left and right. See TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, AVIS ET DÉBATS DU COMITÉ CONSULTATIVE CONSTITUTIONNEL (Documentation Française, 1960), 75-80, 101-02, 164-65 . This mistrust is best illustrated by article 64 of the Constitution, which, instead of treating the judiciary separately as a branch of the state, calls it "judicial authority," thus reducing its designation merely to the task it performs. 36 The Constitutional Council also had (and it still has) original jurisdiction over disputes regarding the regularity of presidential elections and observance of the internal rules of the two Chambers of Parliament. See 1958 CONST., art. 61 . This jurisdiction of the Council is not relevant to the discussion in this article.
was finally "on the books." In other words, review was necessarily a priori and, thus, abstract in nature. 37 Furthermore, to foreclose the Council from ever displacing parliamentary majorities' choices where the President's political interests were in no way threatened, the drafters reserved the right to refer laws to the Council to only a few major political actors: the President of the Republic, the Prime-Minister and the Presidents of both Chambers of Parliament.
38
Clearly, this design vastly maximized institutional stability at the cost of suppressing minority opposition and citizen input. It also meant that the Constitutional Council was not born a full-blown constitutional court, rather it was expected to perform the role of a quasi-judicial appendage of Parliament, thus allowing the consolidation of presidential powers in the first years of the Fifth Republic.
39
As expected, there were few referrals during this early period, none of which included a constitutional question of great political salience.
40
The Council's limited constitutional jurisdiction, no doubt part and parcel of an institutional design meant to further the role of the presidency in the French political and constitutional order, would undergo major transformations in the 1970s.
2.
The Birth of Positive Constitutional Review Few decisions are as transformative to a legal order-and surely to the reviewing body that announces them-as those establishing entirely novel competencies. Mr. Poher triggered the events by referring a challenge to the constitutionality of a National Assembly-approved bill meant to give certain superior officers in the national administration (i.e., préfets) the right 37 See 1958 CONST., art. 61. 38 See id. 39 See SWEET, supra note 18 at 41. Given the political and institutional stakes involved, the Council's holding in Liberté d'Association-invalidating portions of the bill due to violations of the right of free association-while significant, was far less consequential than its decision to incorporate sources of substantive economic and social rights into the bloc de constitutionnalité, against which all future bills would be evaluated. For in promoting such incorporation, the Council effectively opened the gates to positive constitutional adjudication.
Yet, opening the gates would not amount to much without a steady flow of referrals. During the early years, their volume and relevance remained severely constrained due to rules that bestowed on few political actors the standing to initiate such review. Certainly, it did not help that these actors until then had belonged to the same center-right/right majority, to whom making frequent referrals would be counterproductive. The Constitutional Reform of 1974 relaxed standing requirements and, thus, gave a further boost to the Council's newfound constitutional powers. Cognizant of his narrow electoral victory in the 1974 presidential election and seeking to create safeguards against a future leftist government, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing successfully proposed a constitutional amendment extending to any combination of 60 Deputies or 60 Senators the right to refer legislation to the Council.
47
By giving minority coalitions, i.e., the opposition, the right to trigger constitutional review of bills, the amended article 61 provided the caseload the Council needed to perform its new mission as a positive constitutional adjudicator. In fact, adding the opposition to the roster of referring authorities caused an explosion in the number of referrals: in contrast with 51 referrals in its first 15 years , the Council entertained a total of 221 referrals in the following 15 years , a more than fourfold increase (i.e., 423%) in the Council's constitutional docket.
48

C.
The Strange Birth of Conformity Review in France Just as the growth in the Council's constitutional activity was about to take off, at a time when its members and the political class had not yet become accustomed to the idea 44 See Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 238 n. 2. 45 See Liberté d'association, REC. 29 (considérant 2.). 46 See 1958 CONST., Preamble. 47 See Ponthoreau & Hourquebie, supra note 22 at 276-77. 48 See Favoreu & Philip, supra note 40 at 937-54. that parliamentary bills can be overridden by positive constitutional adjudicators, the Council entertained a case that would profoundly affect the manner in which all French judges would approach the relationship between national law and France's international commitments. On December 20, 1974 a splinter group of majority coalition Deputies, dissatisfied with a government-sponsored bill that allowed abortions prior to the tenth week of the gestational period in situations of "mother distress," relied on the recently amended article 61 to challenge the bill's constitutionality and international conformity.
49
Reviewing the bill strictly as a referral under article 61, the Council declared that the challenged provision did not violate the individual freedom (i.e., liberté) "enunciated in article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen," 50 and thus held the bill as constitutional. 51 However, when pressed to determine whether the national legislation conformed to the European Convention of Human Rights, the Council deferred. The Council reasoned that, by virtue of the "difference in the nature of these two reviews," 52 i.e., constitutional review (pursuant to art. 61) and conformity review (pursuant to article 55 53 ), "it lacked competence, once seized under article 61, to evaluate the conformity of a [national] law with the provisions of a treaty or an international agreement," the latter an attribution of article 55.
54
By adopting this interpretation, the Council abdicated from conducting review of legislation for compliance with France's international commitments. This occurred at a moment when the process of European integration was accelerating. In hindsight, the Council's decision to pass on conformity review seems remarkable and unwise. French scholars have written volumes criticizing IVG, 55 some even pondering how the Council could abandon it.
56
While addressing these criticisms would require going beyond the scope of this study, suffice it to say that, logistically, the Council was not prepared then (and, in my view, is still not prepared now) to be confronted with one more expansion on its jurisction given the compressed timeframe under which it operates (30 days). While somewhat confusing, this staggered adoption of conformity review reflects the High Courts' perceptions of their roles and capabilities, as well as their differing views on European integration overtime, which has also contributed to their being perceived as varying in their commitment to European judicial integration.
60
After a brief description of the evolution of this new form of review in these Courts, this article will turn to an analysis of the empirical validity of such perceptions and other hypotheses.
A.
Cassation's Embrace of Conformity Review Soon after IVG, Cassation entertained an appeal from a decision by the Appellate Court of Paris that had invalidated a French consumption tax (article 265 of the French Customs Code) due to its incompatibility with article 95 of the Treaty of Rome. 61 Remarkably, Advocate General (Procureur Général) Touffait urged Cassation to embrace conformity review and maintain the decision to strike down the French statute solely on Treaty of Rome grounds. The idea behind basing this decision on this sole independent legal ground was to establish that the supremacy of EU law in France rested not merely on French constitutional law (i.e., article 55 of the Constitution, hence the provenance of the Council), but on EU law itself (i.e., the Treaty of Rome as construed 58 The constitutional reform of 1992, which allowed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, altered article 88 of the Constitution by giving EU law a specific constitutional status in French law. The amended article 88-I reads: "The Republic shall participate in the European Communities and in the [EU] constituted by States which have freely chosen by virtue of the treaties which established them to exercise some of their powers in common." 1958 CONST. 59 See Loi pour la confiance dans l 'économie numérique, 2004 -496 DC (June 10, 2004 (considérant 7) (declaring that "the transposition of a Community directive into domestic law is a constitutional requirement" and that, as such, laws of transposition are subject to review) ("Economie numérique"), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseilconstitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions- depuis-1959/2004/2004-496-dc/decision-n-2004-496-dc-du-10-juin-2004.901.html. by the ECJ, 62 the provenance of French judges as ordinary judges of Communitarian law). To Touffait, the principle that EU law applies in France as a result of its concurrent, yet independent, sovereignty with the Constitution derived from the fact that "the transfer of power made by the Member States from their internal legal orders in favor of the legal order of the Community" had operated a "definitive limitation of their sovereign rights." 63 In sum, EU law was binding regardless of its status in French law.
Despite prior ECJ rulings on Communitarian law's supremacy and self-executing status, 64 to make such a proposition to Cassation at that time might have seemed radical if one considers the history of legislative supremacy in France. However, in light of France's obligation to bring its laws into conformity with Communitarian law and the Constitutional Council's major abdication of conformity jurisdiction in IVG, it was necessary to fill that void. Indeed, the Advocate General expressly recognized the need for conformity review of French statutes by stating that "from the position taken by the Council, one can thus conclude that it falls on the courts before which this problem has been presented, and it inheres to them alone, under penalty of denial of justice, the task of addressing it." 65 Cassation accepted the invitation and became the first French High Court to strike down a national statute (not merely a bill) for incompatibility with the Treaty of Rome. Yet, while recognizing that the Treaty of Rome had created a "separate legal order," the Justices at Cassation still referred to article 55's treaty supremacy clause as concurrent authority.
66
B.
Council of State's Delayed Embrace of Conformity Review The uninitiated in French judicial history will find it quite remarkable that the Council of State would only take up conformity review in 1989, fifteen years after Cassation's Vabre decision. Holding to the tradition that the administrative judge is not to review the validity of legislation, the Council of State refused to take this step even as other notoriously recalcitrant national courts in Europe-the German Federal Constitutional Court (1971) Seeking to end its isolation in Europe and among the French Courts, the Council of State seized upon this opportunity and embraced conformity review by holding that the French electoral statute did not violate the Treaty; doing so, however, pursuant to the authority deemed implicit under article 55.
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With legislative supremacy now a part of the past-at least with respect to treaty-law-the Court positioned itself to shape Communitarian law and, thus, participate in a process that had been in operation for more than three decades. Viewed in this perspective, Nicolo was as revolutionary as it was reactive. It was part of a phenomenon taking place throughout Europe, where national courts, operating under the growing pressure of ECJ and ECHR precedent, sought to secure a role in the evolution of European law so as to, in the words of Frydman, "break their monopoly."
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C.
Conformity Review Resurfaces in the Constitutional Council Facing similar external and internal pressures, but lacking "as applied" authority (except on electoral law) per IVG, the Constitutional Council's ability to participate in the interpretation of European law in France was quite restricted. In fact, the adoption of conformity review by the other French High Courts might have delayed the arrival of concrete (i.e., ex post) constitutional review in France, the other method through which the Council could potentially influence the interpretation of French law vis-à-vis France's European commitments. In fact, as Cassation and the Council of State grew accustomed to reviewing the compatibility of French statutes with European law, which itself had been incorporating fundamental rights through ECJ and ECHR adjudication (which often targeted national laws), a form of de facto, "as applied" constitutional review came into existence in France.
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For instance, in the year 2001 alone, the Council of State entertained over 2,000 challenges to the conformity of domestic measures to the European Convention of Human Rights.
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Still, in the realm of abstract (i.e., ex ante) constitutional review, the Council had some room to maneuver to become a relevant player in interpreting EU law in France. Yet, doing so without reversing IVG-and thereby incurring the heavy administrative burdens that it had originally sought to avoid-was the challenge. The Council would finally accomplish this feat in 2004, by embracing a nuanced (not surprisingly) version of conformity review, engineered through a measured withdrawal from IVG's extreme position. aspects of electronic commerce and messaging. They challenged that, as written, the bill violated the constitutionally protected rights of privacy and individual freedom of communication (article 34).
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Article 88-I-the product of the 1992 constitutional reform that ratified the Treaty on European Union-had promoted the incorporation of EU law in the French legal order. In it, the Council found a specific, novel constitutional authorization for reviewing the conformity of transposing laws to directives, on the theory that the obligation to "transpos[e] . . . results from a constitutional requirement." 80 Accordingly, the Council announced it would now engage in conformity review, even when seized under article 61, a clear departure from IVG. Only this time, article 88-I's specific bestowal of supremacy on EU law would provide the rationale, not article 55, as that path remains foreclosed by the portion of IVG that still governs.
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The Council was extremely careful in establishing the scope of this nascent review. Specifically, by construing its role under article 88-I as solely that of a guardian of the constitutional obligation to transpose, the Council ensured that it would only exercise review over one type of national norm: laws of transposition. This meant that bills not expressly designed to accomplish transposition, yet somehow conflicting with existing directives, would not be reviewed. Under the Council's narrow interpretation, the nonconformity of a law, other than a law of transposition, was not a violation of article 88-I's constitutional requirement of transposition. Yet, as Parliament enacts several laws every year, which may overlap with existing directives, deciding to skip review of laws not of transposition, while not an oversight, is a significant abdication of jurisdiction. Moreover, the Council also declined jurisdiction to consider referrals challenging legislative provisions that do no more than transpose the "direct, necessary and precise" effects of a directive, 82 apparently on the belief that the routine job of assuring that national measures give direct effect to secondary Communitarian law falls on ordinary French judges in their role as Communitarian law judges.
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Thus, the Council limited the scope of its own conformity review to (i) ruling on the conformity of bills expressly designated as laws of transposition; and, as to this particular type of bill, (ii) examining nontrivial questions pertaining to their constitutional duty to transpose. invalidated. 86 This meant that it placed secondary Communitarian law under the French Constitution, thereby underscoring the constitutional character of the Council's conformity review. In announcing this new version of conformity qua constitutional review, the Council managed to rebalance its powers to optimize several aspects of its role as a constitutional court in a changing European legal landscape. First, by reviewing only the most complicated questions regarding interpretation of laws of transposition, it did not greatly disturb the balance of power among French courts. Second, in narrowing the scope of review to such laws, it protected the twin policy aims of IVG, namely (i) focusing on its role as a constitutional reviewer; and (ii) controlling its docket in light of the time constraints under which it operates. Finally, in directly engaging with EU law, the Council furthered the process of EU legal integration, although it remained anachronistically beholden to the view that EU law owes its supremacy to its foundations in France's constitutional order.
That national courts would retain such views, even as the ECJ had long declared the (unconditional) supremacy and direct effects of EU law, is not surprising. 87 Other European national Courts had done the same. 88 Indeed, the adoption of such parochial conceptions of EU law supremacy is the result of historical judicial turf wars (la guerre des juges), with national courts reacting and adapting to the decline of national law as EU integration proceeds and the influence of ECJ jurisprudence grows. These "wars" are also responsive to another dynamic: the institutional rivalry among national High Courts. In this sense, the ready acceptance of conformity review by Cassation and its late, begrudging, adoption by the Council of State and the Constitutional Council are the result of a multi-causal, highly interactive process. Regardless of one's beliefs as to the relative contribution of external and internal factors to the emergence of conformity review in France, it seems clear that, among the three High Courts, Cassation was the only one to embrace a concurrent theory of EU law supremacy in France. Both the Council of State (article 55) and the Constitutional Council (article 88-I) firmly grounded their duty to ensure conformity solely on French Constitutional grounds. This article now attempts to empirically verify whether these Courts' different views on the status of Communitarian law result in different levels of directive enforcement in France.
IV. Data Description and Methodology
To test whether distinct theories of EU law supremacy lead to different levels of directive enforcement, I looked at quantifiable aspects of "directive cases" entertained by these parallel adjudicatory systems. These quantifiable aspects ranged from establishing the obvious, such as determining whether a directive was enforced, to coding for more intricate variables, such as the type of national measure invoked (e.g., law of transposition, etc.), the case's subject matter, the reasons for non-enforcement of a directive (e.g., out of scope, procedural impediments, etc), whether the referral of a preliminary question to the ECJ was requested or granted, the status of the litigants (e.g., private party or government), etc. I coded for these other variables to detect whether differences in directive enforcement, if any, might be related to differences in these Courts' dockets (mainly Cassation and Council of State), 89 rather than differences in their stated views on EU law supremacy. For instance, a substantial portion of Cassation's civil and commercial docket involves private litigation. This can never occur in litigation before the Council of State, France's Supreme Administrative Court, where the government is invariably a litigant.
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In sum, coding for litigant status allowed me to compare private party vs. government litigation (or vice-versa) in both Courts to ensure that any difference that I might detect on the treatment of directives is not attributable to differences in the type of litigants appearing before them.
A.
Defining a Directive Case So far, I have used the term "directive challenges" to describe conformity cases before France's three High Courts. In reality, I looked at more than just challenges involving the conformity of national law to directives. I looked at all cases where a litigant or a court, sua sponte, invoked both directives and national law in some manner. Specifically, the point was to cover (i) direct conformity challenges of the type "directive says X, national measure says Y (i.e., where Y somehow contradicts X), therefore enforce X," (think intersecting circles in a Venn Diagram); (ii) claims for parallel enforcement, as in "both directive and national measure say X, therefore enforce X" (think concentric circles in a Venn Diagram); and (iii) situations where, depending on how the Court rules on scope, "X displaces Y (or vice-versa)" (think separate, non-overlapping circles in a Venn Diagram). This broad definition avoids under-inclusiveness, reduces complex boundary issues (but does not eliminate them completely as I discuss later) and ensures that the entire universe of directive conformity review is captured regardless of the argument made or final determination reached.
B.
Data and Methods 89 The focus on Cassation and the Council of State in this empirical section owes to the fact that the Constitutional Council has entertained only 8 conformity review referrals since its June 10, 2004 Economie numérique decision. See infra note 94. 90 For the reasons adduced in Parts II and III.C, the government is also always a litigant before the Constitutional Council.
Period of Study
I collected data covering completed results of conformity review in the period from October 20, 1989 to December 31, 2008. The reader will recall the initial date as the day the Council of State announced its Nicolo decision. That choice owes to the fact that any comparison between the two French Courts that have handled the bulk of conformity review cases (i.e., Cassation and Council of State) should begin only on or after the second has embraced conformity review. Indeed, going back to 1975 would produce uninteresting results: the Council of State would unequivocally and unfairly appear as Europhobic merely due to its initial fourteen-year reluctance to overcome legislative supremacy and review national laws.
2.
The Data The three main sources of primary data were (1) The combined use of these databases allowed me to focus my search on directive cases, as described above, and ensured that, through different research queries, I captured the entire population of directive cases adjudicated in these Courts.
3.
Assembling and Coding Cases To avoid double-counting in situations where either Cassation or Council of State, in considering a case, referred a prejudicial question pertaining to the interpretation of a directive to the ECJ, I made sure that only the final Court decision, i.e., after ECJ input, counted as a case, despite being assigned a different decision number (i.e., arrêt and pourvoi, in Cassation and Council of State, respectively). Obviously, the ultimate variable of interest in this study is each Court's level of directive enforcement, which I calculated from the universe of directive cases they entertained. A directive is enforced any time a party (or Court) invokes its application and the Court either expressly or implicitly relies on it as it announces its decision. Because of the formulaic, nonnarrative style of French opinion writing, I had to check the final holdings of some especially difficult implicit-enforcement cases against the opinions of either Advocate General (Cassation) or Solicitor (Council of State) to finally ascertain whether a directive was enforced or not. I also used this procedure to clear up questions with respect to the other variables of interest in the study.
V. Results and Analysis
As hypothesized earlier, should the conventional wisdom on how the French High Courts approach EU law be correct, one would observe different rates of directive 91 I thank Isabelle Goanvic, Councilor (Conseiller référandaire) and Assistant Director of the Documentation Section at Cassation for helping me with research on the Court's Intranet. 92 I thank Jacques Biancarelli, Councilor (Conseiller d 'Etat) Table I presents the number of directive cases heard by the three High Courts. The greater number of Council of State and Cassation decisions explains why, from this point forward, my analysis focuses solely on the conformity cases they entertained. All tables and background information on statistical tests conducted are presented in the Appendix. Table A ) reveals that, among Cassation's 462 cases, directives were enforced 88 percent of the time (407 cases), while 12 percent (55 cases) resulted in non-enforcement. Remarkably, Council of State review results were essentially the same: rounded enforcement/non-enforcement rates were 88 percent and 12 percent, respectively. These results show not only that the French Courts share a high rate of directive enforcement, but also that varying the reviewing Court has no impact on the likelihood of enforcement.
To discard the possibility that very small observed differences in raw percentages could still produce a statistically significant relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, I performed a Fisher's exact test. I obtained a p value that far exceeded .05 (two-tailed), and thus could not corroborate the conventional wisdom hypothesis that Council of State review is less likely to enforce directives than Cassation review. That the source of review has no impact on the rate of directive enforcement indicates that differences in these Courts' approach to EU law have not played a role in whether directives are effectively enforced. This major finding negates the anecdotal, no doubt historically influenced (see Part III), divergence theory. 
B. Effect of Differences in Cassation's and Council of State's Dockets
Accounting for Litigant-Based Differences Between Cassation and Council of State
In refuting the conventional wisdom, this study's major finding of similar rates of directive enforcement must be checked against the possibility that, by aggregating all cases each court handled, it ignored docket differences that might reveal how different attitudes toward EU law supremacy impact the rate of enforcement. For instance, a critic could object that such an aggregate comparison does not account for the fact that civil and commercial cases, much of which is private litigation, make up about 68 percent of Cassation's docket, whereas all litigation before the Council of State involves the government.
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To account for this fact, I examined only private-to-government litigation in Cassation's docket and compared it to the Council of State's docket.
a.
Initial Results At first look, a comparison of the Courts' directive enforcement rates in privateto-government litigation does produce different results (see Table B1a ). The reduction in Cassation's volume of adjudication pushes the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT up to about 95 percent (277 cases), which, compared to the 88 percent observed in the Council of State, supports the conventional wisdom. Moreover, a p value of .002 corroborates the hypothesis of a relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT. This result casts a shadow of doubt over the earlier finding of no relationship reached by considering all cases. Therefore, I decided to investigate further to detect if some cause other than these Courts' different views regarding EU law supremacy might be responsible for this shift. I began by looking at the reasons for nonenforcement.
b.
A More Nuanced Look at Litigant-Based Differences: Enter the Out-of-Scope Justification i. Finding Some Theoretical Hints In a study of ECHR decisions, James Sweeney argues that national courts' preferred justification for refusing to apply the Convention is to hold certain situations as factually falling outside the scope of the Convention or ECHR jurisprudence, even when a Convention provision is on point. tolerates this practice and affords domestic courts some measure of discretion so that "they can balance for themselves conflicting public goods" in areas implicating major domestic public policy.
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A similar version of this "margin of appreciation" argument appears in Xavier Groussot's analysis of the relationship between EU law and French public law. Groussot argues that, unlike Cassation, which does not hesitate to apply "general principles of Community law to obligations resulting [purely] from internal law," the French "administrative courts generally refuse to apply the general principles in purely internal matters." 99 He explains that, in the Council of State's view, general principles of EU law "only apply in the national legal order when the situation falls within the scope of Community law."
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As an illustration, he suggests and cites to recent opinions where the Council of State only applied the general EU law principle of legitimate expectations in situations coming squarely within the subject matter of a particular directive.
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This makes sense, for administrative review in France has traditionally had a narrow focus, due to administrative judges' restrictive views of their role as mere adjudicators of the legality of administrative acts for excès de pouvoir (i.e., ultra vires review under strict objective legality).
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Clearly, French administrative judges are not at all comfortable with the indefinite, loose-form method of review that is required to give effect to the more subjective legitimate expectations principle. Groussot believes that unease with this "far too indefinite" If Groussot is right, the Council of State's resistance to conducting a broader form of review might explain its lower rate of directive enforcement. More importantly, that would renew doubts as to the validity of the conventional wisdom: for if differences in the Council of State's and Cassation's own margins of appreciation explain their different rates of directive enforcement in privateto-government adjudication, then adherence to different supremacy theories cannot take all the credit.
ii.
Adjusting Litigant-Based Equalization for Margin of Appreciation Differences To account for this "margin of appreciation effect," I eliminated all nonenforcement decisions premised on out-of-scope justifications from both Cassation and Council of State datasets. This is justified because adherence to different scope-ofreview theories will affect whether and how often a Court refuses to enforce a directive on out-of-scope grounds. Also, a Court's refusal to enforce a directive on out-of-scope grounds is not technically a decision that national law trumps the directive, but a statement that the directive simply cannot apply to a particular factual situation presented in the case. Thus, removing out-of-scope cases from the dataset should provide a better comparison between these two Courts when one considers the litigation involving the same types of litigants (i.e., private parties and government). Furthermore, removing outof-scope decisions seems justified in light of the broad approach I took when assembling both "directive case" databases (see discussion in Part IV.A above). Because I included all cases where a litigant invoked both directives and national measures in some manner, I may have included cases where the connection between directives and national measures is remote at best. Therefore, removing out-of-scope cases should improve the quality of the data while at the same time addressing the potential effect of nonsupremacy-motivated differences in margins of appreciation.
Comparing the Courts' directive enforcement rates in private-to-government litigation without the out-of-scope cases in the data produced a remarkable result: the equalization of litigant composition in Cassation and Council of State adjudication no longer has any impact on the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT. That is, the Courts' enforcement rates are now virtually the same (see Table B1b ). The new comparison shows that, among Cassation's 286 "private party vs. government cases," directives were enforced 97 percent of the time (277 cases), while only 3 percent (9 cases) resulted in non-enforcement. Remarkably, Council of State review results were essentially the same: rounded enforcement/non-enforcement rates were 96 percent (407 cases) and 4 percent (15 cases), respectively. To check if these slight differences in raw percentages amount to a statistically significant relationship between ADJUDICATING COURT and RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT, I performed a Fisher's exact test. Statistical testing (p value approximately .835, two-tailed) refuted this hypothesis. Clearly, adjusting the litigant-equalization table (Table B1a) for traditional scope-of-review differences between the two Courts (Table B1b ) reveals that ADJUDICATING COURT has no impact on RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT.
Again, this result discredits the anecdotal perception of a difference between the two Courts grounded on their different views on EU law supremacy. While one could hypothesize that the Council of State's EU law supremacy views might themselves influence its more restrictive approach to the scope of administrative review, it can hardly be denied that it adopts the same approach throughout its non-European jurisprudence. History clearly shows that is the case. Simply put, the supremacy argument explains too much. Thus, after careful reflection, once differences in the status of litigants before these Courts are accounted for, one still cannot confirm the conventional view.
2.
Accounting for Differences in Domestic Laws Invoked Before Cassation and Council of State A closer look at the kinds of national measures (e.g., laws of transposition, decrees, regulations, acts, etc.) invoked in directive cases before the two Courts reveals a much lower frequency of adjudication involving laws of transposition before the Council of State. After excluding out-of-scope litigation for the reasons discussed in the prior section, I found that while Cassation entertained 156 cases involving laws of transposition, the Council of State entertained only 40 such cases (see Table B2a ). Because conformity review involves the possibility of setting aside different kinds of national measures contrary to EU directives, and because the Council of State has seen adjudication involving laws of transposition much less frequently, one might question the appropriateness of comparing the two Courts' dockets, never mind reaching conclusions that refute received views.
Before addressing this question empirically, it is important to realize why this objection is not dispositive on theoretical grounds. The Council of State, in its concurrent consultative, non-judicial capacity as advisor to the Parliament and government, analyzes every piece of legislation proposed by the latter for conformity with French laws and international commitments.
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In this consultative role, it conducts a formal prescreening of every bill thus submitted, including proposed laws of transposition. This separate reviewing process tends to eliminate flagrantly violating laws, 106 which likely reduces the number of transposing laws that will trigger future litigation. This might explain why, in its "judicial" capacity, the Council of State entertains conformity challenges to laws of transposition less frequently than Cassation, which has no consultative and hence no prescreening role.
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Still, to respond to this challenge empirically, I segregated conformity adjudication before these Courts into two tables: one considering solely law-oftransposition cases (see Table B2a ), the other considering challenges to all other national measures (see Table B2b ). Looking solely at law-of-transposition adjudication, I found that Cassation enforced directives 97 percent of the time (152 cases), while the Council of State did so a bit less frequently, in approximately 93 percent of the cases (37 cases) (see Table B2a ). To check if this slight difference is statistically significant, I conducted a Fisher's exact test and obtained a p value that exceeded .05 (two-tailed). Therefore, there is no statistical difference in the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT between Cassation and the Council of State when conformity cases involving laws of transposition are considered alone. In sum, whether adjudicating private rights (droit subjectifs) (Cassation) or the legality of administrative acts (legalité) (Council of State), when considering the conformity of laws of transposition to directives (conformité objective), each Court is just as likely to enforce directives as the other.
Next, I checked directive enforcement rates in adjudication involving all other types of laws (Table B2b ). The elimination of law-of-transposition cases from both dockets appeared to strengthen the case for convergence between the two Courts. In Cassation, the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT was about 96 percent (255 cases), which, compared to the 97 percent (370 cases) rate observed in the Council of State, would suggest that the latter Court is slightly more likely to enforce directives in such cases. However, a p value of .666 (two-tailed) shows that the effect of ADJUDICATING COURT on RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT is but the result of random chance and, thus, cannot be corroborated. This result, again, shows that the Courts have converging high rates of directive enforcement, despite adhering to different theories of EU law supremacy. More broadly, differences in the volume and types of laws they review are not significant barriers to comparing how they adjudicate cases.
3.
Case Selection Because, under the conventional view, the Council of State is perceived as less deferential to EU law, one may question whether private parties file challenges only when EU directives clearly trump national law, thus accounting for the Council of State's high enforcement rate. Indeed, if fewer challenges to national laws mean only stronger cases are being pursued at the Council of State, the lack of difference in the RATE OF DIRECTIVE ENFORCEMENT between the two High Courts could be a result of case selection, 108 rather than an indication of similar deference to EU law. Arguments for the existence of a selection effect in the context of Council of State review fail for at least two reasons. First, Council of State adjudication is only concerned with cases involving individual or collective organizations resisting some kind of administrative action. The perception of less deference to EU law alone is unlikely to keep these litigants from seeking redress through the administrative courts when they know they are not likely to get any meaningful relief unless they sue.
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Simply put, the existence of "might have been" plaintiffs is inconsequential in this context. Second, private litigants realize that having the Council of State hear their conformity challenges places them in very favorable position since, pursuant to Treaty of Rome article 234, national courts of last resort are required to refer nontrivial questions regarding EU law interpretation to the ECJ. This implies that, by the time Council of State review occurs, every strong (i.e., trivial) case for either type of litigant has already been disposed of, meaning that, if anything, Council of State review is much more likely to involve "harder" cases, the opposite of case selection. Thus, the conventional view is not likely affecting litigants' decisions to file conformity challenges in the administrative courts or appeals to the Council of State.
C. Reconciling the Reality and Perception of EU-Conformity Review
108 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1984) . 109 In stark contrast to administrative adjudication, the state may appear before Cassation in a different posture. In civil cases, it often appears as a common tort litigant, i.e., as a sujet des droits, as if it were a private party having no general claim to sovereign immunity (unlike the state under the U.S. common law system). See Stanwood R. Duval, Sovereign Immunity, Anachronistic or Inherent: A Sword or a Shield, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1471 , 1476 -77 (2010 . However, selection is also unlikely in Cassation's civil cases, where there are alternative means of relief other than litigation, because stronger cases are more likely to be settled or dismissed earlier, leaving only the "harder" cases to final adjudication. Obviously, selection does not occur if private litigants perceive Cassation as a more EU-deferential Court.
Without question, Cassation 's Vabre (1975) and Council of State's Nicolo (1989) announced not only that French "judicial" Courts would review French statutes for conformity with EU law, but created, based on each Court's different justification for doing so (see Part III.A & B), the perception that one (Cassation) would be more deferential to the EU legal order than the other (Council of State). At first look, the formation of such a perception in the past appears reasonable. Indeed, expressly accepting enforcement of EU law as concurrent authority and as soon as the opportunity presented itself (Cassation) is quite different from doing so 15 years later, and only as a matter of national constitutional law (Council of State).
Yet, Cassation's early advance into conformity review occurred largely because most of its docket involves civil and commercial litigation (about 70 percent), 110 making it less likely to implicate, and thus potentially displace, major public policy choices embedded in domestic mandatory law (droit public), the domain of Council of State adjudication. Certainly, legislative sovereignty had a different weight to the two Courts. Moreover, as far as conformity is concerned, the Council of State remained a player on EU law conformity discussions even during the 1975-89 period, when, in its consultative capacity, it could affect the lawmaking process. Still, these differences merely explain why the Council of State waited 15 years longer than Cassation. They cannot explain why or how, once embracing conformity review, even if under a different theory of EU law supremacy, the Council of State, in its judicial capacity, would behave any different than Cassation. After all, once they accepted to conduct conformity review, they both had to act as courts of law in the task of ensuring conformity, which, by its name, mandates deference to supranational law. Thus, whether the Treaty of Rome had created a "separate legal order" having concurrent authority (Vabre) or controlled only by virtue of article 55's treaty supremacy clause (Nicolo), EU directives were to be enforced, period. That the evidence of convergence demonstrates that Cassation and the Council of State have acted alike, despite their different foundational views, should not be a surprise. Rather, the lack of empirical studies on conformity and the literature's focus on the few instances of non-enforcement 111 might explain the persistence of anecdotal perceptions.
1.
What Can and Cannot Be Learned from Each Court's Record of ECJ Referrals An alternative, more straight-forward way of detecting differences in the way the two Courts approach EU law might be to check whether they differ in their compliance to article 234's (Treaty of Rome) obligation to refer EU law questions to the ECJ. Clearly, if one Court uses the referral procedure much more often than the other, one could surmise that it does so because it is more willing to perform the role of ordinary judge of Communitarian law than the other. Arguably, more frequent referrals by one Court would imply that its judges are not only more willing to apply but are also more concerned with uniform application of EU law than judges in the other. Such deference is normally what one would expect from ordinary judges of Communitarian law vis-à-vis their supreme court, the ECJ.
To contextualize this comparison, however, one needs to understand how French courts compare with courts of other EU members. Despite a late start in conformity review by the Council of State, among all EU members, France ranks third (755 referrals) in the cumulative number of referrals (i.e., 1952-2008) The numbers are again very similar, but, of course, not all these referrals presented questions regarding secondary EU law, the focus of this study.
While coding for "directive cases" in the French High Courts, I also took note of their respective number of referrals. Due to the Constitutional Council's extremely brief deliberation period (30 days), they obviously cannot wait for an ECJ answer, so they have referred no questions. Conversely, Cassation and the Council of State, as ordinary Community law courts, do not operate under such constraints and have referred 14 and 12 questions regarding the interpretation of directives to the ECJ, respectively. Figure I reveals an alternating, yet balanced, pattern of referrals during the period of study. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN 1988 AND 1989 AND FORMAL SITTINGS IN 1988 AND 1989 , 41 (1990 total referrals are also nearly identical, at 30 percent and 29 percent, respectively. A difference-of-proportions test demonstrates that this difference is not statistically significant (calculated p value of .89 > .05 (two-tailed)).
Next, I investigated whether the Courts differed in the way they referred cases to the ECJ. Specifically, I looked at how often litigants and Courts, sua sponte, had been the original sponsor of referrals (see Table C1b ). Plausibly, a greater frequency of sua sponte referrals might demonstrate a greater willingness to engage with the ECJ, thus revealing a stronger recognition of the latter's supremacy in declaring EU law. Although the small number of referral cases invites caution when considering these results, I found that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the Council of State had a greater proportion of sua sponte referrals (67 percent or 8 cases) than Cassation (29 percent or 4 cases). However, this difference is not statistically significant (p value approximately .113, twotailed), indicating that the Council of State is not more likely to refer, on its own volition, a directive case to the ECJ than Cassation.
Finally, I looked solely at litigant-initiated requests for ECJ referrals to investigate whether the Courts differed in their reactions to such requests (see Table C1c ). Similar to the argument made in the previous paragraph, a Court's greater receptiveness to referral requests may well reveal its greater willingness to accept ECJ's input, an implicit recognition of the latter's role in spelling out supreme EU law. While the need for caution with the small numbers here still applies, I found that Cassation granted referral requests more than twice as often as the Council of State (69 percent compared to 33 percent, respectively). This difference, however, was not statistically significant (p value approximately .193, two-tailed) , an indication that Cassation is no more receptive to this type of request than the Council of State. In sum, while in raw numbers, the Council of State seems more likely to refer cases on its own volition than Cassation, with the latter Court, in turn, being more likely to grant such requests when instigated by parties in litigation, neither of these relationships are statistically significant. On balance, these differences as to how referrals are channeled through to the ECJ are statistically meaningless and, even if significant, would at most offset each other. Thus, the data on referrals reveals what other tests in this study have already shown: the impossibility of distinguishing these Courts in their roles as ordinary courts of Communitarian law.
2.
A Look at the Forest: Convergence in Annual Enforcement Rates After determining these Courts share high cumulative rates of directive enforcement-and even similar patterns of ECJ referrals-I examined whether their respective rates fluctuated over time (i.e., 1989-2008) . Indeed, the use of percentages based on aggregate data could hide periods of wide fluctuation in the treatment of directive cases between the two Courts. Conversely, narrow fluctuations would tend to indicate uniform application of Communitarian law by France's bifurcated judiciary. Table II shows that, throughout the period of study, the Courts have steadily achieved high rates of directive enforcement, with the last seven-year period showing a slight downward trend in their enforcement rates. The division of the study into three roughly identical periods (of 7, 6 and 7 years) is, however, arbitrary and can be a bit deceptive since it ignores year-to-year fluctuations that, while not disrupting general trends, would require some explanation. 1989 -1995 1996 -2001 2002 -2008 the administrative Court ruled against enforcement on grounds that the directive in question had not yet been transposed into a French national measure. Certainly, conditioning application of a directive on its domestic transposition constitutes a denial of EU law supremacy and direct effect. 119 Arguably, although reliance on this particular non-enforcement ground has occurred only four times (see Table C1a ) 120 in 422 rulings (see Table B1b ), this might explain the persistence of the perception that the Council of State is less likely to enforce directives, thus distorting its overwhelming record of faithfully applying Communitarian law. (No. 1992 /12/CE, Feb. 1992 and 1992 /83/CE, Oct. 19, 1992 ) that exempted their productive activities from taxation. 122 They alleged the State's failure to timely implement the directive had forced them to pay the undue tax for which they sought restitution. Without examining the merits, Cassation rejected these five appeals on grounds that this was a matter for the administrative courts, not the judicial courts, and thus did not enforce the directive as requested. However, in refusing to enforce, Cassation did not assume a position of antagonism regarding EU law supremacy. It merely paid deference to the distribution of judicial business in France, which reserves "to the competence of the administrative courts the quashing or rectification of decisions . . . by authorities exercising executive power . . .."
Court
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The preceding empirical and qualitative analysis shows that one can still make sense of longstanding perceptions of Cassation's and Council of State's relationship with EU law while refuting anecdotal impressions that such differing perceptions actually produce substantial differences in these Courts' decisions. Despite their different views on the relationship between EU law and national law, the data show that, during the period of study, they have acted as bona fide Communitarian law judges, enforcing directives at an overwhelmingly high rate, and referring questions pertaining to the interpretation of directives to the ECJ with similar enthusiasm. This does not mean that the two Courts' views have completely merged, however. Following the fault lines of the French bifurcated judiciary, the Courts will occasionally respond differently to the external influence of EU law. However, it is crucial to understand that occasional different responses are not necessarily reactions to or against EU law, but the result of a much more complex dynamic.
Conclusion
Conformity (and conventional) review emerged in France as a solution to a profound impasse: ensuring compliance of national measures to France's growing international obligations-a constitutional requirement-while holding on to the notion that legislated law could not be called into question-a historical, political, even metaconstitutional principle. France's complex system of constitutional, judicial, and administrative "courts" gradually overcame this impasse in creative and different ways, often prodded by changes in the national and supranational legal landscape. In this process, the French High Courts took their cues from each other and from their supranational counterparts, participating in what came to be characterized as a dialogue des juges. This article investigated a number of contexts in which this judicial dialogue has taken place and demonstrated that Cassation and the Council of State, the two supreme courts that held the monopoly of as-applied review until quite recently, flourished as Communitarian law judges once they embraced conformity review. Not unlike the incremental, treaty-based approach to the creation of the Union, this process of judicial bricolage had unintended consequences. The most profound of these was the de facto death of legislative supremacy, as Cassation and the Council of State enforced directives, at times displacing non-conforming national statutes, an impossibility under France's Constitution. Due to a growing number of Cassation and Council of State referrals to the ECJ, the fate of French statutes, some involving constitutional-order questions, has been increasingly determined in terms of EU law in Luxembourg. While both the creation of as-applied constitutional review (July 2008) and the Constitutional Council's announcement of its first such decisions (May 2010) have "creat[ed] a link between the Council and the citizen," 124 they can also be perceived as France's attempt at monopolizing the determination of constitutional-order questions. This shift, besides finally sealing the fate of legislative supremacy in France, is but the latest in a series of moves by national courts to "catch up" with the pace of European developments and the advance of the supranational courts.
Yet, this re-launch of constitutional review as a parallel review system will introduce a number of challenging "Erie-like" questions that will occupy the minds of French High Court Justices for years to come.
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For instance, what happens when, in a challenge against national law, litigants call for invalidation simultaneously on "serious" constitutional (article 61-1) and Communitarian (Treaty of Rome, article 234) law grounds? Should Cassation and Council of State Justices refer questions to the Constitutional Council and ECJ simultaneously? What to do if the answers are inconsistent? Furthermore, should the Constitutional Council, in its role as guardian of the constitutional obligation to transpose (see Part V.C), refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of a law of transposition that merely gives direct effect to a directive and thus defer to the ECJ referral? Clearly, the side-by-side operation of as-applied review and the largely overlapping conformity review system will likely increase jurisdictional disputes, as all French High Courts play the dual role of national and Communitarian law judges. Ultimately, their decision on these choice-of-law issues will affect not only the rate of directive enforcement but how European judicial integration occurs in the years to come. 124 See Debré, supra note 34 at 19. 
APPENDIX French High Courts' Treatment of Directives under EU Conformity Review
I. Introduction and Methodology
This appendix presents results in two formats: (a) tables containing observed data, and (b) inferential statistical analysis. As far as the body of this article is concerned, tables are interpreted or read row-by-row from left to right. Thus, as I allow the independent variable to vary (e.g., Court in Table A) , I can detect whether and how the dependent variable categories, displayed in each row, change based on their observed frequencies. Of course, to make the information in each cell comparable, each cell's absolute frequency is normalized by dividing it by its column total. This is, however, a non-statistical method of evaluating the merits of research hypotheses. Given the format in which my data is organized, I use Fisher's Exact Test to determine the existence of a relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
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This test also compares data from two dichotomous groups-Cassation and Council of State-to see whether their different impact on the two categories of the dependent variable is statistically significant. Once I calculate a p value, I compare it with the level of statistical significance, which is 0.05 in this study (two-tailed) . If the calculated p value is less than this predetermined level, the null hypothesis is refuted and the research hypothesis is corroborated. The following Because the calculated p value (0.841) is greater than the prespecified level of statistical significance, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship. This means that varying the Court has no effect on the treatment of directives.
In cases where I confirm the null, I conduct a post-hoc power analysis to assess whether Fisher's had a fair chance of rejecting the null. I use a 10 percentage point difference as the effect size, meaning that, given these populations (I am not using samples), I would have a chance of not less than (1-β) of detecting a 10 percentage point difference between one of the observed proportions and a theoretical proportion assumed to be 10 percentage points smaller.
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The following table summarizes the power test (two-tailed, α = 0.05).
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE A
Input Output
Observed These results show that, given these population sizes, I have about a 98 percent chance of detecting a difference of 10 or more percentage points in these Courts' rates of directive enforcement. Excepting Table C1a , which has more than four cells, and Table B1a , which refutes the null hypothesis, the remaining tables underwent a similar analysis. 
II. Results and Statistical Comparison for Remaining Tables in Text
POST-HOC POWER TEST CALCULATION FOR TABLE C1c
Input Output
Observed Proportion = 0.6923 Power (1-β) = 0.0735
Theoretical Proportion = 0.5923 Actual α = 0.0348
